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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BBJIJHIVE STATE BANK,
a corporation,
Plaintif!-Respondent,
- vs. DEON ROSQUIST, GERALDINE
ROSQUIST, and ILA R. PAINTER,
Individuals, and CARPETS INC.,
a corporation,
Defendants,
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a corporation,
Garnishee,
FRED L. PAINTER,
Intervener-Appellant.

Case No.

11951

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by the intervener Fred L. Painter
from a judgment denying him relief upon a complaint
in intervention by which he sought for an order for
release of funds alleged to belong to him and attempted
to be attached under a writ of garnishment procured by
the plaintiff-respondent and served upon the First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. as garnishee. The garnishment
was issued under a judgment procured by the plaintiffrespondent in the principal action. The intervener was
not a party to that action. rr1he garnishment was directed
against assets of the judg·ment debtors. The garnishee,
1

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., answered the writ
of garnishment and alleged that it held no assets of any
of the judgment debtors except a checking deposit in
the joint names of Fred L. Painter and Ila R. PainterI
and that Fred L. Painter had served notice that the
funds in the joint account were his individual funds. In
his complaint in intervention the intervener alleged that
he was the sole owner of all funds which had been deposited in the joint account and that he had made repeated demands upon the plaintiff for release of its
claim upon the joint account which demands had been
refused.
The case was heretofore before this court on appeal
by the plaintiff from a jndgnient granting a motion of
the present intervener for release of the fund. The
majority of this court adopted the view that the judgment then appealed from was a surrunary judgment and
the case was remanded. The majority opinion stated:
"We are of the opinion that this case cannot be
settled by a summary judgment based upon the
undisputed evidence now before this court. The
interest of Ila R. Painter in and to the fund while
she was alive, if any she had, should be applied
toward the satisfaction of the appellant's judgment." (Italics supplied)
The opinion is reported in 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 Pac.
2d 468.

DISPOSITION IN 'rHE LOWER COURT
After trial before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall,
the court made and entered findings, of fact, conclusions
of law and garnishee judgn1ent in favor of the plaintiff.
2

The intervener moved for amendment of the findings,
conclusions, and judgmt>nt. Amended finding and conclusions of law were made, but not in conformity to the
inteIYener's motion. The court again ordered judgment
mfavor of the plaintiff. The intervener then filed notice
of appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
'l'he intervener-appellant prays for reversal of the
judgment and that tht> trial court be directed to enter
judgment in favor of the intervener and against the
plaintiff-respondent for the amount of the joint account,
together with interest from date of service of garnishment, also for intervener's costs, including a reasonable
attorney fee.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts on this appeal are as follows:
Plaintiff had a judgment against the defendants
Deon Rosquist and Geraldine Rosquist, his wife, and Ila
R. Painter, wife of the intervener, based upon a contract
for purchase from the defendant Carpets Inc. allegedly
signed by said defendants. (R. 35 and R. 50) The contract had been guaranteed and assigned by the defendant
Carpets Inc. to plaintiff. The intervener was not a party
to such contract or such judgment. On February 3, 1964,
plaintiff procured to be served upon First Security Bank
of Utah, N.A., a garnishment issued under said judgment. (R. 52) The garnishee made an answer to the
garnishment reciting that it had no assets belonging to
any of the judgment debtors, except as follows: (R. 53)
3

"This bank had a joint deposit account in the
name of Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter at
the time of service of said writ, with a then
balance of $723.79, and on which we are informed
some checks issued by Fred L. Painter were then
outstanding. On February 6, 1964, we were served
with written notice by said Fred L. Painter in
which he stated that funds deposited in said joint
account were his sole property and that he claims
the same as sole owner. On Febnrnry 7, 1964, he
presented a check drawn by him against said joint
account for withdrawal of the full amount remaining in said account, and demanded payment of
said amount to him. In the absence of proof or
knowledge to the contrary we assume that the
statement and claim of Fred L. Painter are correct. Said Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter are
also indebted to this bank on a note yet due in an
amount greater than the amount of said joint account at time of garnishment."
No traverse or reply to the garnishee's answer was
at any time filed by plaintiff nor did plaintiff at any
time offer evidence to rebut it. On April 9, 1964, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment against the garnishee
(R. 54), which motion was denied without prejudice.
(R. 12)
Plaintiff took no action at any time to implead Fred
L. Painter.
Ila R. Painter died February 12, 1966. On August
29, 1967, Fred filed his Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Dismiss Garnishment. (R. 57-58) This motion
was supported by affidavit. (R. 59)
The motion for leave to intervene was granted (R.
61) and the matter was heard before the Honorable
4

Stewart M. Hanson, September 15, 1967. (R. 62) Plaintiff filed no counter-affidavit and offered no evidence to
rebut the intervem':i ·s affidavit. (R. 75)
The Court on September 19, 1967 made and entered
Findings of ]'act and Conclusions of Law (R. 74-76)
which among other things recited that testimony was offered on the part of the intervener; that no testimony
was offered on the part of the plaintiff or the garnishee;
that the matter was argued and submitted; also:
"The Court finds from the affidavit of the intervener and from the evidence presented herein
that said intervener was not a party defendant
in the above entitled action; that Ila R. Painter
is now deceased; that the funds deposited in said
joint bank account were at the time of deposit the
sole property of said intervener and not the property of his wife, Ila R. Painter; that said intervener was at the time of service of said writ of
garnishment on said garnishee the true owner of
said joint bank account; that by reason of service
of said writ of garnishment said intervener has
been continuously deprived of use of funds constituting said joint account.
"That the intervener has made numerous demands
upon the plaintiff, Beehive State Bank, for release of said funds but such demands have been
wrongfully refused and said plaintiff continues
to refuse to release said writ or said funds. That
the intervener has been compelled to employ an
attorney to institute these proceedings to procure
release of said funds from the claim of the plaintiff. That $250.00 is a reasonable sum to be allowed the intervener for services of his attorney
herein."
Judgrnent in Garnishment Proceedings was signed
5

and entered :-ieptember 19, 19G7 ( H. G7), in accordanc1·
with the Findings and Conclusions of tile Court.
The plaintiff appealed from the decision and judgment of Judge Hanson. 'l'lw matter was heard before
this court and the majority held the view that the judgment rendered by Judge Hanson was a sunmiary judgment and that the case could not be disposed of by
smmnary judgment.
A dissenting opinion was fikd by Mr. Justice Henriod in which he held that the judguwnt of the trial court
should be affirmed.
After remand of the case, the intervener, with leave
of court, filed a formal complaint in intervention (R. 95)
alleging that all deposits in the joint account were made
by him from his own funds and were made with the specific intent that upon the death of either himself or his
wife the funds remaining in the account should be the
property of the survivor; that his wife is now deceased;
that the plaintiff had caused ·writ of garnishment to bP
served upon the depository, First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., and that by reason of this, said bank had refused
to release to the intervener the funds in said deposit;
that the intervener had made repeated demands upon
the plaintiff for release of the garnishment but that
plaintiff had at all times wrongfully refused to release
the fund; that it had therefore become necessary for
the plaintiff to institute this proceeding to procure release of the fund. The intervener prayed for judgment
for release of the deposit to him and for interest and
costs and attorney fee.
6

Answer was filed by the plaintiff (R. 102) admitting
the garnishment and the fact of death of Ila R. Painter.
Also that there was in the joint deposit account the sum
of $723.79 and that plaintiff claimed it to be subject to
its garnishment. Plaintiff prayed that the complaint in
intervention be dismissed and that plaintiff be awarded
judgment against the garnishee for the amount of the
deposit and for interest and its costs.
The garnishee defendant filed answer (R. 99) admitting the fact of the joint deposit and praying that
the court determine the rights of the plaintiff and intervener and enter judgment accordingly.
Trial was had before the court August 13, 1969, with
the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, presiding. Oral and documenta1-y evidence was presented. (Tr. 173-174) Thereafter a Memorandum Decision was filed (R. 130) reciting
conclusions of the court as follows:
"l. That the contract in the names of Fred L.
Painter and Ila R. Painter created a joint
tenancy relationship.

2. That the Intervener presented no evidence that
the joint deposit contract should be reformed
or varied or that the same was unenforceable.
3. That a garnishee judgment should be entered
in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of
the joint account."
On October 8, 1969, the Court signed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as propo·sed by
counsel for plaintiff. (R. 131)
On October 13, 1969, counsel for intervener mailed
7

to the court Intervener's Motion for Additional Findings
of Fact, and Motion for Amendment of Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 139), and
mailed copies to opposing counsel. Counsel for intervener also submitted proposed Amended Conclusions of
Law and Amended Judgment (R. 148-150) which intervener contended were in accordance with the evidence
and the law.
On November 14, 1969, hearing was had on the pending objections and motions of the intervener (R. 161)
and on November 28, 1969, the Court signed and filed
its Memorandum Decision.
December 3, 1969, the Court signed and filed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 163)
December 29, 1969, intervener's notice of appeal and
band for costs on appeal were filed. (R. 169)
February 9, 1970, the Court entered an order extending time for filing record on appeal. (R ----)
February 18, 1970, record on appeal was filed.
At trial of the case before the Honorable Gordon
R. Hall on August 13, 1969, the plaintiff offered in evidence Exhibit 1-P, a copy of the bank signature card
bearing signatures of Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter
and it was received. (Tr. 174) Intervener's exhibits as
follows were received in evidence:
2-I, (copy of bank ledger sheet)
3-I, (copy of bank statement of September 1968)
4-I, (copy of deposit slip dated January 23, 1964)
5-I, (copy of deposit ticket dated January 2, 1964)
(See Tr.176and177.)
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The intervener, Fred L. Painter was sworn and testified as follows: (Tr. 178-186) That he was the husband
of Ila R. Painter; that she is now deceased; that he made
the deposit at First Security Bank of Utah, represented
by Ex11ibit 4-I (deposit ticket dated January 23, 1964 in
the amount of $300.00) and Exliibit 5-I (deposit ticket
dated January 2, 1964, $660.00) that it was his own
personal money which went into those deposits; that the
deposit tickets each bear his signature (Tr. 179); that
his wife did not make any deposit in the joint account
(Tr. 179 and 185) ; that the joint account was kept for
household expenses (Tr. 182); that his wife could write
checks on the account but she did not; that his wife had
a cash allowance; that she had no income except such
cash allowance (Tr. 184); that all deposits shown on the
Bank ledger sheet, Exhibit 2-I, were made by the intervener from his own funds (Tr. 179) ; that subsequent to
the service of plaintiff's garnishment on the First Security Bank, he had attempted to withdraw funds from
the joint account but payment had been refused.
Counsel for the intervener then offered in evidence
the writ of garnishment served on the First Security
Bank as garnishee on or about February 3, 1964, also
the answer of the garnishee to interrogatories shown on
the writ of garnishment. (Tr. 187) It was stipulated
by counsel for plaintiff that no traverse or reply was
made by plaintiff to the garnishee's answers. (Tr. 188)
Counsel for the intervPner was sworn and testified that
he had represented the intervener as counsel in the
former proceedings, inclnding appeal proceedings and in
the present proceedings, and that in his opinion a reason9

able fee for such services as attorney, exclusive of services on the fonner appeal, would be at least $500.00.
The plaintiff offered no evidence except tl1e copy
of bank signature card. All parties having rested, the
case was taken under advisement pending submission
of briefs.
Thereafter the court filed its m<.:morandum decision
and furtl1er proceedings were had as hereinabove set
forth.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A JOINT BANK ACCOUNT IS NOT SUBJECT TO
GARNISHMENT UNDER A JUDGMENT AGAINST
ONE OF THE JOINT OWNERS EXCEPT TO THE
EXTENT OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S INTEREST.

This court said in its opinion iu the former appeal
of this case, 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 Pac. 2d 468, 471:
"We are of the opinion that this case cannot be
settled by a summary judgment based upon the
undisputed evidence now before this court. The
interest of Ila R. Painter in and to the fund while
she was alive, if any she had, should be applied
toward the satisfaction of the appellant's judgment against her." (Italics supplied)
The court also said :
"It is well settled that a joint bank account is
subject to garnishment by a judgment creditor of
only one of the joint depositors. However, it has
also been held that where the depositor has no
interest in the joint bank account, although his
name is on the signature card, the account is not
subject to garnishment under a levy of execution
10
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by his judgment creditor. See 30 Am. Jur. 2d,
Executions, 800, wherein it is said:

'In jurisdictions applying the general rule

that joint bank accounts are vulnerable to
seizure by the judgment creditor of one depositor, the courts usually hold that the judgment creditor's rights are limited to the
amount of the funds in the account equitably
owned by the debtor depositor and do not
extend to funds equitably owned by the other
depositor. Thus, the view has been expressed
that if the evidence shows that the depositors
have an equal right to the funds in the joint
account, a garnishing creditor of one of them
may recover one-half of the moneys in such
account. * * * '
"Cases discussing this point are collected in the
annotations in 11 A.L.R. 3d 1473 (1967). Decisions are listed from the United States Federal
Courts, as well as from the States of Arkansas,
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. Only
Minnesota has held the entire fund to be subject
to garnishment by a judgment creditor of one of
the depositors."
Appellant submits that the trial court failed to give
effect tothe above holding of this court. Evidence was
presented by the intervener which shows without any
contradiction whatever that the intervener was the sole
contributor to the joint deposit. (See Transcript, pages
178-185 and Exhibits 2-1, 4-1, 5-1) It further shows that
there was no intention on his part to make the deposit
as a gift to his wife. The intention was to give her a
survivorship interest in case she survived him. The
11

language of the signature card (Exhibit 1-P) is that the
funds deposted "shall be owned by them jointly with
right of survivorship." The intervener is the survivor
of the joint tenancy. He can claim the fund by that right.
He was also the sole contributor to the deposit. If a
dispute had arisen between the intervener and his wife
in her lifetime as to ownership of the fund the wife
would have been entitled to nothing except a survivorship right. The wife died first. Her survivorship right
then terminated. The plaintiff, as judgment creditor of
the wife can claim nothing more than she could have
claimed. The intervener could have claimed the entire
fund at the time of the attempted garnishment. He can
claim it now.
The intervener made request to the trial court for
specific findings upon issues presented by his complaint
in intervention. (R. 139) The court made no such findings, and appears to have assumed that facts relating to
intention of the parties or ownership of funds which
went into the joint account are irrelevant and immaterial.
Appellant submits that this does violence to the holding of this court on the former appeal and is in conflict
with cases and authorities cited in that opinion. It is
inconsistent with the holding of this court in Holt v.
Bayles, 65 Ut. 364, 39 Pac. 2d. 715. In that case it was
held that the bank signature card established a survivorship right which could not be attacked after death of
one of the signers except upon grounds of fraud, mistake
or other equitable ground. 'l'he holding of the trial court .
here is also inconsistent with the case of Tangren v. I
Ingalls, 12 Ut. 2d 388; 367 Pac. 2d 179, which departed
12
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from the rule in Holt v. Bayles by holding that the presumption raised by the terms of the signature card was
rebuttable and that proof of ownership of the funds
which went into the deposit and as to the intentions of
the ]Jarties was admissible and can be controlling.
The intervener herein, being both the survivor of
the joint tenancy and also the sole contributor to the
fund in the joint de]Josit, is entitled to judgment in this
case, whether the court now follows the rule of Holt v.
Bayles or the rule of Tangren v. Ingalls. In other words,
the intervener here is entitled to the fund upon the
theory adopted in the majority opinion in the Tangren
case and is likewise entitled under the theory adopted
in the dissenting opinion.
This court in its opinion on the former appeal in
this case cited the case of Culley v. Culley, 17 Ut. 2d 62,
404 Pac. 2d 657.
lt quoted language from that case as follows:
"We recognize that from a recital of joint ownership with the right of survivorship there arises
a presumption that such is the fact.

The holding of the trial court in the Culley case
was that evidence of ownership of funds which were
deposited in the joint account was admissible and that
as against the surviving joint tenant the estate of the
deceased tenant was entitled to the fund where the deceased tenant was the sole contributer to the fund.
In the Culley case, this court again divided, with the
minority holding to the rule of Holt v. Bayles, and the
majority holding that ownership of funds which went
13

into the joint account, and intention of the parties, would
be controlling over language of the bank signature card
giving either party a right to make withdrawals. It was
pointed out in the majority opinion that these bank signature cards are furnished by the banks and are signed
by the parties at the bank's reqiw:-:t and are intended for
protectimi of the bank. Both the trial court and the majority of this court recognized the fact that such signa.
ture cards are often used by depositors for some special
purpose to obtain convenience which such accounts af.
ford, and not with intention to operate as a present gift
or transfer of ownership of the funds. The opinion
quotes with approval language used by Mr. Justice Cardozo in llloskowitz v. lllarrow, 215 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E.
506, 66 A.L.R. 870:
"The plain implication is that as between the depositors themselves the form of the deposit gives
rise to a presumption and nothing more.... "

It should be noted, in connection with that statement that in the Moskowitz case it was held by the New
York court as set forth in the headnote in 66 A.L.R. 870:
"Independently of statute, a savings bank deposit
made by one person to the credit of himself and
another, 'payable to either or the survivor of
them' and the delivery of the pass book to the
latter, would have been insufficient either to establish an intention to make a gift or to effectuate a delivery of the subject matter of the gift."
This is important in the matter now lwfore this court in
which an attaching creditor of Ila R. Painter seeks to
levy upon a fund which was deposited by Fred L. Painter
with intention to give his wife a survivorship right but
14

without any intent to make a present gift or transfer
to her.
The opinion on the former appeal of this case also
cites the case of Braegger v. Loveland, 12 Utah 2d 384,
367 Pac. 2d 177. In that case the administrator of the
estate of a decedent who was named with his sister as
owner of a joint bank account sued to recover the fund
from the sister. The trial court held that the signature
card raised a presumption that they were equal owners
and awarded one-half to the plaintiff This court held
that the defendant as survivor was presumed to be the
owner; that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff
to overcome such presumption; that the evidence was
insufficient to overcome the presumption, and that the
defendant was entitled to judgment for the entire fund.
The court commented as follows:
"In any contest over the ownership of funds in
such an account the objective is to determine
where the true ownership is, and this in turn often
depends upon what the intent was in creating the
account."
In the Braegger case the cour also ref erred to the
case of First Security Bank of Utah v. Demiris, 10 Utah
2d 4-05, 354 Pac. 2d 97, 100. In the Demiris case it was
pointed out that in that case the evidence pointed unerringly to the fact that there was no intent on the part
of the decedent to make a gift to the wife who was
named as a joint owner on the bank signature card. In
the Demiris case the right of the decedent's administrator to recover from the decedent's wife who had withdrawn the fund in the lifetime of the husband was upheld.
15

The intervener in the case now before the court sub.
mits that the Culley ease, the Braegger case and the
Demiris case all support the right of the intervener who
was not only the sole owner of the funds placed in the
joint
but also is the surviving joint tenant.
The case of Hanks v. Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 Pac.
2d 836, is also ref erred to in the opinion of the court in
the former appeal of this case. In that case two <laugh.
ters were named as joint tenants on a bank signature
card with their mother who had deposited funds in a
bank account. After the death of the mother, other
heirs brought suit to recover funds which had been withdrawn by the daughters from the account shortly prior
to the mother's death. The trial court granted judgment
in favor of the defendant daughters (i.e., the surviving
joint tenants) and this court affirmed, saying:

"We are thus brought to a consideration of the

principal difficulty confronting the plaintiffs:
They are trying to def eat the effect of a written
instrument. It is endowed with a presumption
of validity. Its provisions, including the recited
facts of joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
must be given effect unless it is successfully attacked on some proper ground; and it can only
be overcome by clear and convincing evidence."
(Italics supplied)

In the case now before the court the intervener can
stand on the right of survivorship as given by the terms
of the signature card. He can also ::-;tand upon the equitable right which he could have asserted in a contest
with the other joint tenant in her lifetime. The right
16

of the _plaintiff as garnishing creditor of the other joint
tenant cannot rise higher than her right.
''The cases Jealing with the question are harmonious in holding that a wife's creditor has no
right to levy against a bank account maintained
jointly in the names of husband and wife but in
which all of the funds belonged to the husband."
11 ALR 3d 1487 (Citing 111 F. Supp. 152; U.S.
vi;. Third National Bank & Trust Co.)
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT FUNDS WHICH WERE DEPOSITED
IN THE JOINT ACCOUNT WERE FUNDS BELONGING TO THE INTERVENER.

The bank ledger eard, Exhibit 2-1, shows that there
was a balance of $17 4.29 in the account on December 31,
1963, and that thereafter only two deposits were made
up to the date of the plaintiff's attempted garnishment.
These were $660.00 on January 2, 1964 and $300.00 on
January 23, 1964. Fred L. Painter testified that he made
all deposits which were made in the account and that
the writing on the deposit tickets, Exhibits 4-I and 5-I,
was his writing. (Tr. 179) Also that his wife did not
check on the account; that she had a cash allowance;
that he the intervener; used te account for his convenience in payment of household expense. (Tr. 179, 185)
POINT III
IN AN INNER VIVOS CONTROVERSY BETWEEN
JOINT TENANTS THERE IS A PRESUMPTION IN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE - THAT THEY OWN
IN EQUAL SHARES. BUT SUCH PRESUMPTION
HAS NO EFFECT WHEN EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED.

In this case, if a controversy had existed between

17

Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter as to thPir res1wctiw
rights in the joint bank deposit at the time of service
of plaintiff's garnishment, the law would have raised a
presumption, in the absence of evidence, that each owned
a one-half interest, but with evidence available as to
ownership of funds which went into the deposit such
presumption gives away and has no effect. The present ·
controversy before the court is not between the joint
tenants but between an attaching creditor and the sur- •
viving joint tenant. The attaching creditor's right does
not rise higher than the right of its debtor. The proof
before the court is that Ila made no contribution what- •
1
ever to the fund and that she could not have successfully
1
claimed any part of the deposit as against Fred L.
Painter at the time of the garnishment.
I

POINT IV
THE INTERVENER IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY FEES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEAL, BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF'S
CONTINUING REFUSAL TO RELEASE THE
WRONGFUL GARNISHMENT.

The plaintiff had notice immediately after the service of the garnishment that Fred L. Painter clain1ed to
be the owner of funds in the joint account. rrhe answer '
of the garnishee (Tr. 53) recited this. Repeated requests
were made to plaintiff's counsel for release of the gar·
nishment and were met with refusal. rrr. 187 and 191 1
It therefore became necessary for the intervener to em·:
ploy an attorney to bring this proceeding for release
of the fund. Plaintiff at all times knew that it had no
judgment or claim against the intervener.
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Where a garnishment is wrongful, the injured party
is entitled to damages, including attorney fees.
"Where an order of attachment or garnishment
is improperly obtained or tortiously employed,
the defendant in the proceedings may have several
modes of obtaining redress for injuries caused
thereby. He may proceed on the attachment or
garnishment bond, if one has been given, sue for
malicious or wrongful attachment or garnishment,
or maintain an action for abuse of process or
malicious prosecution." 6 Am. Jur. 2d 984, Sec. 596
"The owner of property seized under an attachment against property of another may hold the
attaching creditor liable for damages arising from
the wrongful attachment, at least if such creditor
has either actually participated in such levy, as by
ordering or directing it to be made upon particular
property, or subsequently ratifies or adopts it... "
6 Am. J ur. 2d 992, Sec. 606
"Ratification of a wrongful levy of attachment on
a stranger's goods may be predicated upon the act
of the attachment plaintiff in refusing upon demand, to release the goods, after being notified
as to who owned them." lb. Footnote 17.
"Even though the creditor or party suing may not
have originally participated in any way in the
levy upon the goods not belonging to the party
named in the attachment or execution writ, he
may become liable to the owner by reason of
some subsequent conduct, such as by giving his
assent or acquiescene thereto, which amounts to
ratification or adoption of the officers act." Annotation 91 A.L.R. 930 (citing numerous cases)
"The creditor's failure to repudiate the officer's
wrongful levy, upon a partner's individual property, of an attachment directed against a partnership, combined with his effort to justify the
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levy when the partner sued (after the attachmern
had been ordered dit>charged), was held a ratifi
fication in Frick-Reid h'upply Co. v. Hunter, 19U
47 Okla. 151, 148 Pac. 83, the court ruling that
'where, after an officer makes an unlawful leV'i
on property of a third party, the plaintiff in ai.
tachment, with knowledge of the facts, defends
the wrongful act, he will be held to have ratified
the same, and to be liable in an action of trespass
as an original wrongdoer;' and, further, that 'om
who would avoid responsibility for an act committed in his interest by an officer should, when
knowledge of the wrongful act is brought to his
attention, make known his disapprobation thereof:
otherwise he will be held to have ratified it."
The case cited makes an interesting quote from Lord
Coke as follows :
"He that agreeth to a trespass after it is done
is no trespasser unless the trespass \Vas done to
his use or for his benefit, and then his agreement
subsequent amounteth to a commandment." 4 Coke i
Inst. 317

"In an action for wrongful garnishment which is
not malicious, the measure of damages is the
actual injury sustained under the general rules
barring remote or speculative consequences. Interest and attorney's fees may be allowed. .. ·
In the absence of loss or deterioration of the
property garnished, the value of its use during
the period of detention, together with the necessary expenses of regaining possession, constitutes
a fair measure of damages. Where the garnishment was of money or notes, legal interest during
the period of detention constitutes the value of
its use which may be recovered as damages." 38
C.J.S. 612 Sec. 313 b.
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Adair v. James M. Peterson Bank, 61 Utah
159, 211 Pac. 683; St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v.
450, 195 Pac. 305, 28 C.J. 544.
Love, 57
"Attorney fees necessarily expended by the
garnishee or claimant by reason of the wrongful
garnishment may be recovered as damages." 38
C.J.S. 613, n. 85
Oklahoma State Bank v. Reed, 288 Pac. 281,
283, 143 Okla. 131, 85 A.L.R. 635.
"Exemplary or punitive damages are recoverable where the garnishment was not only wrongful
but malicious or vexatious." 38 C.J.S. 613, n. 87
CONCLUSION
The decision of this case will have far-reaching
consequences. If it should be held that a creditor of one
of two or more persons shown as owners of a joint bank
account with right of survivorship may levy by garnishment or attachment or execution against funds in such an
account and thereby cut off not only the survivorship
right to which the parties have in writing agreed but also
cut off the right of owners not parties to the attachment
suit or to the judgment to show their equitable rights
or interests in the joint account - then it will deny
rights which a great majority of persons depositing
money in such accounts have assumed they have. It will
jeopardize or destroy the practice which has been utilized
by countless persons who have desired to make deposits
which will pass to a surviving wife or child or husband
or other person without the requirement of probating
an estate.
If this court now holds that an attaching creditor
of one only of the joint tenants can claim the entire fund
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regardless of the intention:s of the parti(•s in establishing
the joint account and regardless of equitable rights of
the parties, then the court will have departed from fundamental principles of equity and co-tenancy and will have
shown an unwarranted and unjustifiable sympathy for
creditors.
Lastly, it will not be consistent with the former opinion of this court in this case nor with either the majority
or the minority opinions of the court in the case of Tangren v. Ingalls, supra, or the case of Culley v. Culley,
supra, or Braegger v .Loveland, supra.
The inte,rvener appellant is entitled to judgment
against the plaintiff for the amount of the funds attempted to be taken by garnishment together with legal
interest from date of garnislunent and his costs including a reasonable fee for services of his attorney herein
at trial and on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Will L. Hoyt
.Attorney for Intervener- '
.Appellant
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